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Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Eroding the Legal Profession's System of Self-Governance?
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of maintaining that it is not in the business of
regulating attorney ethics,1  the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), pursuant to section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (the Act),2 has established rules governing attorney
action when confronted with a corporate client's wrongdoing (the
Final Rules).3 Section 307 specifically required a rule
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a
material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company
or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or
the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately
respond to the evidence.., requiring the attorney
to report the evidence to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors not employed directly or
indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.4
1. See, e.g., Letter from David M. Becker, General Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission, to Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law, University of
Illinois (March 28, 2002) (on file with North Carolina Banking Institute) ("[S]ince the
Carter and Johnson Rule 102(e) proceeding, 47 SEC 471 (1981), the Commission has
not brought Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers based on allegations of
improper professional conduct, or otherwise used the Rule to establish professional
responsibilities of lawyers.").
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2002) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-377).
3. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
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The ideas behind section 307 are not new, nor are the
concerns regarding balancing the attorney-client relationship
against other interests such as investor protection and economic
security.5 The SEC's rules of attorney conduct are based on the
SEC's philosophy that the corporate attorney is vital to the
successful functioning of the SEC and to the investing public.6
The Final Rules detail the process by which an attorney
must climb the corporate ladder to report client misconduct.7
While section 307 does not specifically authorize SEC rules
requiring that corporate attorneys report client misconduct outside
of the client organization, the original proposal by the SEC (the
Proposed Rules) included limited outside reporting requirements.8
These "noisy withdrawal" provisions have been postponed, but not
forgotten.9
5. See Abraham C. Reich & Michelle T. Wirtner, What Do You Do When
Confronted With Client Fraud? To Disclose or not to Disclose Is Becoming a Very
Public Question, Bus. L. TODAY, at 39, 41 (Sept./Oct. 2002) (noting that "just how
counsel should respond when faced with evidence of a client's wrongdoing is a topic
that has long divided the bar" and that prior standards in this area do exist). See
generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate
Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 (1996) (discussing the
uncertainty of what a securities attorney must do to take precautions against and to
disclose client fraud); Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure
Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221
(1995) (examining alternative whistleblowing policies for lawyers).
6. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,670 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (stating "the Commission, and the
investing public, must be able to rely upon the integrity of in-house and retained
lawyers who represent issuers").
7. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205). The Final Rules are specific in
detailing to which individual or committee the attorney must report, see
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6321-22 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(1), (b)(3)), to avoid "a situation in
which one attorney might report some evidence of a material violation to one
committee of directors while another attorney might report other evidence of a
material violation to a second committee, obscuring the full, cumulative significance
of reported evidence." Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71,686.
8. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,673. "Under certain circumstances, these provisions permit or
require attorneys to effect a so-called 'noisy withdrawal' and to notify the
Commission that they have done so and permit attorneys to report evidence of
material violations to the Commission." Id.
9. Otis Bilodeau, SEC Signals Lawyers Still in Crosshairs, LEGAL TIMES,
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/View
&c=LawArticle&cid=1043457916491&t=LawArticleCorp (Jan. 28, 2003).
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Many believe that section 307 and the ensuing rules put the
attorney into conflict between fulfilling section 307's disclosure
requirements and protecting the attorney-client relationship.1 °
There are fears that individuals within the corporate client will
hesitate to consult with the corporate attorneys on crucial matters
for fear of being reported to management." In addition, section
307 has raised concerns because it is one of the few federal
legislative attempts to regulate attorney professional
responsibility, which, until now, has been controlled by the states
and local bar organizations. 2 There is an uneasy feeling that the
legal profession's tradition of self-governance is in danger.
3
Others, however, believe it is past time for such changes. 4
The Final Rules address many questions left unanswered
by section 307 of the Act, including: What does it mean to practice
"before the Commission in any way in the representation of
issuers" - which attorneys are affected by section 307?15 What
conduct is "material" so as to require reporting to the chief
executive officer, audit committee, or directors?16 What evidence
10. See Guy Harrison, Protecting Our Profession, 65 TEx. B.J. 678, 678 (2002).
"[T]here is certainly some risk that corporate lawyers will end up owing conflicting
duties to their clients and to the public." It is important to remember that in the
context of corporate representation, "the lawyer represents the corporation and its
shareholders." Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Speech by Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman: Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association's Business Law Section, at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm
(Aug. 12, 2002).
11. See Harrison, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., id. ("the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an intrusion into the regulation of
the practice of law"); Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 43 (noting that, with few
exceptions, "the regulation of lawyers has traditionally been the exclusive province of
state supreme courts" and commenting on the profession's "self-governing" status);
Becker, supra note 1 (noting "[t]here has been a strong view among the bar that
these matters are more appropriately addressed by state bar rules, which historically
have been the source of professional responsibility requirements for lawyers, and
have been overseen by state courts").
13. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 39. The article goes on to note that
"[I1f the profession fails to adequately police itself, our government will enact
legislation that not only polices lawyers, but extends liability for corporate
governance fiascos." Id. at 43.
14. See 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(stating that part of the cause of recent corporate scandals "is that some lawyers have
forgotten their responsibility").
15. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,675 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002).
16. Id. at 71,678-79.
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triggers the reporting requirement - must the attorney undertake
an investigation?17 The scope of the Final Rules is both broad and
troublesome.
This Note examines section 307's effect on the existing
regime of attorney ethics regulation. Part II of this Note provides
a synopsis of the history of section 307 of the Act.18 Part III places
section 307 in the context of the existing corporate landscape and
of similar existing rules such as the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 and 17 C.F.R. §
201.102." Part IV questions the scope of authority left open to the
SEC by section 307's broad language, including: attorneys affected
by section 307 and the Final Rules as defined by "practice before
the Commission," the meaning of "material" conduct, and what
"evidence" will trigger an attorney's responsibility to report up the
corporate ladder.2" Part V examines what, if any, whistleblower
protections are available for attorneys who report corporate
wrongdoing as mandated by section 307 of the Act and the Final
Rules.2'
II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 307 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:
FROM 1981 TO THE PRESENT
Since 1981, the SEC has not taken an aggressive position
regarding attorney reporting responsibilities.22 In 1981, the SEC
considered implementing rules of attorney conduct to end client
non-compliance with SEC disclosure rules, but the ABA argued
17. Id. at 71,681-84.
18. See infra notes 22 through 31 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 32 through 53 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 54 through 105 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 106 through 116 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 1 ("[S]ince the Carter and Johnson Rule 102(e)
proceeding, 47 SEC 471 (1981), the Commission has not brought Rule 102(e)
proceedings against lawyers based on allegations of improper professional conduct,
or otherwise used the Rule to establish professional responsibilities of lawyers.").
But cf. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71,673 (noting that while the SEC has not adopted formal rules of
professional conduct for attorneys, the SEC has held "on a case-by-case basis that
lawyers appearing and practicing before the Commission have an obligation to report
corporate misconduct to appropriate officers and directors").
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against adoption and ultimately defeated the proposition. 3 Since
that time, the Commission has steadfastly refused to undertake
regulation of attorney ethics.24
2001 and 2002 saw many scandals shake the foundations of
the corporate world. In the wake of Enron and other corporate
scandals, over forty professors of law from across the United
States wrote a letter asking the SEC to implement a rule requiring
lawyers to report a client's wrongful acts to the highest authority of
the client organization.2 6 Noting one of the professor's articles on
the subject 27  and the Bar's insistence that regulation of
professional ethics be left to state bar rules and state courts, the
SEC intimated that any change in attorney ethics regulation
should be initiated by congressional legislation, not by SEC
initiative. 8
While attorney responsibility for corporate client
wrongdoing was debated among members of the legal profession,
the subject was also contested in the House and Senate. North
Carolina Senator John Edwards, taking note of the attitudes of the
23. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 392 -
93 (6th ed., 2003).
24. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. See Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Corp. Responsibility, Preliminary Report
of the Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Corp. Responsibility July 16, 2002, 58 Bus. LAW.
189, 190-91 n.3 (2002). WorldCom's revelation that it had overstated its earnings in
excess of $3.8 billion resulted in a twenty percent workforce reduction and a loss in
market capitalization of almost $115 billion. Id. Adelphia Communications sought
bankruptcy protection after disclosing that it had guaranteed billions of dollars in
loans to its controlling shareholders. Id. Tyco International lost approximately $100
billion in market capitalization following allegations of looting of corporate funds by
its chief executive officer and general counsel. Id. Over a three-year period (1999-
2001), the former head of Global Crossing Ltd. sold stock in the company in excess of
$700 million. Id. Global Crossing Ltd. has now declared bankruptcy amid claims of
inflated revenues based on nothing more substantive than accounting maneuvers. Id.
26. See Letter from Richard W. Painter et al., Professors of Law, to the
Honorable Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 7,
2002) (on file with North Carolina Banking Institute). While Painter's letter also
indicates that some of the letter's signers "believe that in certain circumstances a
lawyer should also be required to do more than report to a client's board of
directors," the letter stopped short of recommending external reporting requirements
for corporate lawyers. Id. The SEC's Proposed Rules, however, did contain limited
external reporting requirements. See Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71,673-74, 71,688-90.
27. Painter & Duggan, supra note 5.
28. See Becker, supra note 1.
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ABA and the SEC, roundly criticized the corporate lawyers, the
Bar, and the SEC, stating that if the SEC would not respond to the
concerns stated in the professors' letter, then Congress would act.29
On July 24, 2002, Congress approved the Act, including section
307,30 and President George W. Bush signed the new legislation on
July 30, 2002."'
III. SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 307 IN THE CONTEXT OF
EXISTING RULES
Section 307 does not exist in a vacuum. Administrative
agencies, the ABA's Model Rules, and state bar rules all have
provisions regarding when an attorney must take remedial action
based on a client's wrongful conduct.32 Section 307 of the Act
mandates SEC regulations requiring corporate counsel to report
up the corporate ladder when the attorney has "evidence" that the
company is acting in some way that is either illegal or a breach of
duty.33 Some lawmakers would push government regulation of the
legal profession beyond the current scope of section 307 and
beyond the current scope of existing rules.34 Certain members of
the legal profession also believe that attorneys should be required
to do more than report internally. 35 The Proposed Rules went
beyond the Act's express mandate and created limited instances
where external reporting would be required.36 Section 307 of the
Act does not create a private cause of action and the Final Rules
confirm that only the SEC has enforcement rights.37
29. See 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
30. Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 39.
31. Id.
32. E.g., id. at 39, 41-42.
33. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2002) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-377).
34. Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 40. During the Act's passage through the
Senate, "Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to attach
an amendment to S. 2673 that would have restored a private cause of action for
aiding and abetting in securities cases." Id.
35. Painter et al., supra note 26 (remarking that "some of [the signers of the
letter] believe that in certain circumstances a lawyer also should be required to do
more than report to a client's board of directors").
36. See Mitchell Pacelle and Michael Schroeder, Proposed SEC Rules Could
Turn Lawyers Into Whistle-Blowers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003.
37. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
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A. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Section 307 of the Act enables and requires the SEC to
establish rules of ethics for those attorneys practicing before it.38
The only rule specifically set forth in section 307 requires attorneys
covered by the act to report "evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof," first to the chief legal counsel or
chief executive officer and then, if appropriate remedial action is
not taken, to the audit committee, a committee of independent
directors, or to the full board of directors.
39
B. American Bar Association's Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13: Organizations as Client
In contrast to section 307, the rule promulgated by the
ABA contains no such mandatory provision for "climbing the
corporate ladder."4 ° Instead, ABA Model Rule 1.13 provides that,
if a company's lawyer knows that someone within the client
organization
is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act
in a matter related to the representation that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or
a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization.41
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6323 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.7); Reich &
Wirtner, supra note 5, at 40.
38. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (mandating that the SEC "issue rules.., setting forth
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers... .
39. See id.
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002) (emphasis added).
20031
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The circumstances that give rise to attorney action under
ABA Model Rule 1.13 are narrower than in section 307 of the Act.
While section 307 requires an attorney to climb the corporate
ladder to report evidence of a material violation of law or fiduciary
duty regardless of relation to the attorney's representation,a2 ABA
Model Rule 1.13 requires attorney action only if: 1) the lawyer
knows of an actual or potential violation; 2) the violation is in
regard to a matter related to the attorney's representation; and 3)
the violation will likely result in substantial harm to the
43corporation.
4
In comparison, under section 307 of Act, actual knowledge
of a violation is not required; mere "evidence" of a violation will
suffice.a  Further, the violation need not be related to the
attorney's area of representation under section 307: any "material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation" must be reported.45  Finally, section 307 does not
condition its internal reporting requirement on any finding that the
violation would result in harm to the corporation. 6 Thus, the
focus of Sarbanes-Oxley includes protection of the investors, not
solely protection of the corporate entity.47
C. Rule 102(e):48 Appearance and Practice before the
Commission
The SEC already has disciplinary power over the attorneys
who practice before it.49 This disciplinary power is embodied in
Rule 102(e).5" Although this provision has been applied rigorously
42. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002).
44. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,670 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2002).
49. See id.
50. Id. The SEC may discipline anyone, including an attorney, who is found:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others;
or
(ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in
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to accountants, prior attempts to apply the provision to attorneys,
without express statutory authority, have met with stiff resistance
from the Bar.5" Section 307 of the Act settles the question of the
SEC's power to regulate attorney professional responsibility in
favor of the SEC.5 2 Section 307 not only authorizes but requires
the SEC to create and enforce "Rules of Professional
Responsibility for Attorneys" for those practicing before the
SEC.53
IV. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 307 AND THE FINAL RULES
The Act applies to those companies registered under
section 12 or required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 54 The Federal Reserve is clear
that any bank, bank holding company, state member bank, or
foreign bank that is subject to these provisions of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 is also subject to the Act, including
section 307, and any related rules adopted by the SEC.55
Section 307 of the Act places certain attorneys (those
"appearing or practicing" before the SEC) under the SEC's rules
and enforcement of professional conduct.56 These attorneys also
remain subject to the rules of their jurisdiction to the extent the
jurisdiction's rules "impose additional obligations" and are not
unethical or improper professional conduct; or
(iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
Id.
51. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,671-72; supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
52. Cf. Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 39 (discussing the passage of the Act
and the existing rules regarding attorney reporting of client misconduct).
53. Id.
54. Guidance on Requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, SR 02-20, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 43-356, at
46,809, 46,809 (Oct. 29, 2002).
55. See id. The Federal Reserve also notes that while "[b]anking organizations
that are not public companies generally are not covered by the provisions of the
Act... [they] may be subject to similar requirements under other laws or Federal
Reserve or FDIC regulations." Id. at 46,812.
56. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Ethical
and Legal Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 178 (2002).
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inconsistent with the SEC's Final Rules.57 The authority granted
the SEC by section 307 is broad with minimal limitations on the
agency's power to regulate.5 8  The exact scope of authority
conferred on the SEC by section 307 is not clear from the language
of the provision.59 In addition to the general mandate to establish
rules of professional conduct, section 307 requires an SEC rule
compelling lawyers who practice before the SEC "to report
evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation"6 to higher authorities within
the corporation. 6' The reporting rule is based on a standard the
SEC has attempted to implement in the past.62
A. "Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission"
Because the phrase "practice before the commission" is not
defined in section 307 of the Act, the SEC created its own
57. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6320 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.1). If the SEC
Rule "set[s] a more rigorous standard," the SEC Rules will preempt the state rules.
Jonathan D. Glater, S.E.C. Adopts New Rules for Lawyers and Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2003, at C1. The Final Rules further state that "[a]n attorney who complies
in good faith with the provisions of this part shall not be subject to discipline or
otherwise liable under inconsistent standards imposed by any state or other United
States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or practices." Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6323 (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 205.(c)). The SEC goes on to clarify, however, that this protection
does not apply where the attorney's jurisdiction imposes "additional requirements...
that are consistent with the Commission's rules." Id. at 6314.
58. See Cramton, supra note 56, at 178. "The phrase 'minimum standards of
professional conduct' characterizes all professional rules of conduct. The only
constraints are the limitation to lawyers practicing federal securities law and the
requirements that the rules serve the public interest and protect investors." Id.
59. Cf. id. (noting that "[t]he many questions that will arise concerning the scope
of SEC authority ... are important matters").
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2002) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-377).
61. Id.
62. Cramton, supra note 56, at 179.
In essence, it is a version of the standard that the SEC has been
pushing for years: in-house and outside counsel who become aware
of facts strongly suggesting that an agent of a corporation is
involved in securities fraud must take steps, designed to be
effective, to ensure that the board understands what the lawyer has
discovered and must take steps to encourage the board to take





definition, which is based on the definition set forth in 17 C.F.R. §
201.102(f).63 An attorney appears or practices before the SEC in
instances including:
(i) [t]ransacting any business with the Commission,
including communications in any form;
(ii) [r]epresenting an issuer in a Commission
administrative proceeding or in connection with any
Commission investigation, inquiry, information
request, or subpoena;
(iii) [p]roviding advice in respect of the United
States securities laws or the Commission's rules or
regulations thereunder regarding any document that
the attorney has notice will be filed with or
submitted to, or incorporated into any document
that will be filed with or submitted to, the
Commission, including the provision of such advice
in the context of preparing, or participating in the
preparation of, any such document; or
(iv) [a]dvising an issuer as to whether information or
a statement, opinion, or other writing is required
under the United States securities laws or the
Commission's rules or regulations thereunder to be
filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the
Commission....'
"In the representation of an issuer" is defined as "providing legal
services as an attorney for an issuer, regardless of whether the
attorney is employed or retained by the issuer."
65
The Final Rules cover attorneys who provide "legal
services to an issuer within the context of an attorney-client
63. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,675-76 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
205.2(a)).
64. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6320 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)).
65. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6321 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 2 05.2(g)).
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relationship" whether or not the attorney is employed in the
issuer's legal department.66 Attorneys retained by the issuer to
investigate material violations reported under the Final Rules are
themselves bound by the reporting requirements.67  The Final
Rules narrowed the meaning of "appearing and practicing" from
the Proposed Rules to respond to commentator concerns about
applying the rules to those attorneys who are "admitted to
practice" but are "employed in non-legal positions and do not
provide legal services.,
68
Section 307 "makes no distinction between inside and
outside counsel advising a reporting company., 69 The Proposed
Rules, however, set forth clear provisions that would affect in-
house and retained counsel in different ways if the reporting
attorney did not receive an appropriate response7 ° from the client's
66. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6298. The Proposed Rules' definition was very broad and would have
encompassed attorneys not employed in the legal department of an issuer and even
attorneys who were not acting as attorneys, but who nevertheless transacted business
with the SEC or assisted in preparation of documents filed with or submitted to the
SEC. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,675-76. Attorneys licensed in foreign jurisdictions fell into the scope
of the Proposed Rules. Id. at 71,676. The Final Rules clarify that in order to be
bound by the Final Rules, the "attorney must have notice that a document he or she
is preparing or assisting in preparing will be submitted to the Commission."
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6298. The Final Rules also limit application to foreign attorneys. Id. at 6303-04.
67. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6322 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(5)).
68. Id. at 6301. See id. at 6297-98.
69. HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 23, at 398 n.6.
70. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,676-77. The Proposed Rules defined an appropriate response as one
that provides "a basis for an attorney reasonably to believe: (1) [t]hat no material
violation.., is occurring, has occurred, or is about to occur; or (2) [t]hat the issuer
has, as necessary, adopted remedial measures .... Id. at 71,676. The Final Rules
kept these basic provisions and added a third option. Floyd Norris, No Positives in
This Legal Double Negative, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at C1. If the reporting
attorney is satisfied that the issuer, with appropriate consent, has retained counsel to
review the matter and: 1) "[h]as substantially implemented any remedial
recommendations made by" the attorney after "reasonable investigation and
evaluation of the reported evidence" or 2) "[hlas been advised that such attorney
may, consistent with his or her professional obligations, assert a colorable defense on
behalf of the issuer ... in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding
relating to the reported evidence of a material violation." Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6320 (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b)(3)). The SEC does not intend that this third option will
"encompass all defenses" but only those defenses an attorney may assert consistent
[Vol. 7
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directors or his supervising attorney.7 The Proposed Rules, in the
case of an ongoing or impending violation, would have compelled
an attorney retained by the issuer to: 1) withdraw from the
representation, stating "professional considerations" as the reason
for withdrawal; 2) within one business day give notice of
withdrawal to the SEC, stating "professional considerations" as
the reason for withdrawal; and 3) disaffirm any material that the
attorney was involved in preparing that is to be filed with or
submitted to the SEC "that the attorney reasonably believes is or
may be materially false or misleading.,7 2 An attorney who is "in-
house" would not have to resign his position, but he would be
required to: 1) notify the SEC that he intends to disaffirm any
materially false or misleading statements and 2) thereafter
promptly disaffirm any such material he had a part in preparing.73
In both cases, the attorney would only need to notify the
SEC if the violation is impending or ongoing and the violation is
"likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the issuer or of investors., 7 4  In the case of past
violations, retained or in-house counsel would be permitted, but
not required, to follow the withdrawal and SEC notification
procedures described.75 The "noisy withdrawal" provision of the
Proposed Rules drew much criticism from the members of the
profession.76 Others believed that the negative response to the
"noisy withdrawal" requirements was unwarranted because the
with his professional obligations. Id. at 6301. The perceived effect is quite different.
"'Colorable' is a very low standard .... All this makes it unlikely that any lawyer will
ever be forced by this rule to consider quitting." Norris, supra.
71. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. at 6323 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.4). A supervisory attorney is one
that supervises or directs an attorney "who is appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer." Id. (to be codified at § 205.4(a)).
Once the supervising attorney has received evidence of a material violation from a
subordinate attorney, it is the supervising attorney's responsibility to comply with the
reporting requirements of § 205.3. Id. (to be codified at § 205.4(c)).
72. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71,688.
73. Id. at 71,688-89.
74. Id. at 71,688.
75. See id. at 71,690.
76. Glater, supra note 57.
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SEC also provided an "opt-out" provision.77 The SEC postponed
implementing the "noisy withdrawal" requirements to allow for
further public comment.78 Part of the SEC's revised proposal
would require the client company, not the attorney, to report the
attorney's resignation to the SEC.79 The Final Rules do, however,
contain a provision under which an attorney covered by the rules
may reveal to the Commission, without the issuer's
consent, confidential information related to the
representation to the extent the attorney reasonably
believes necessary: (i) [t]o prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation that is likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the issuer or investors; (ii) [t]o prevent
the issuer, in a Commission investigation or
administrative proceeding from committing
perjury,... suborning perjury,.., or committing an
act proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that is likely to
perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or (iii) [t]o
77. See Letter from Richard W. Painter, Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rwpainterl.htm
(Dec. 12, 2002). Under the Proposed Rules, if an issuer formed a qualified legal
compliance committee ("QLCC"), an attorney fully fulfilled his reporting obligations
by giving his "evidence" to the QLCC. See Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71,687-88. The SEC retained the
QLCC option in the Final Rules. Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6322 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 205.3(c)). A QLCC is a committee: 1) whose members consist of "at least
one member of the issuer's audit committee" (or "an equivalent committee of
independent directors" if the issuer does not have an audit committee) and two or
more members who are not employed by the issuer, and who are not otherwise
interested parties; 2) has a written policy for responding to evidence reported under
the Final Rules; and 3) has authority to report up the corporate ladder, investigate,
and recommend an appropriate response to evidence. Id. at 6321 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)). The QLCC's authority must include authority to notify the
Commission in the event that the issuer fails in any material respect to implement an
appropriate response" recommended by the QLCC. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
205.2(k)(4)). If the issuer has established a QLCC, a reporting attorney needs do
nothing more than report the evidence of material violation to the QLCC. Id. at
6309. The burden of complying with the Final Rules falls to the QLCC. See id.
78. Michael Schroeder, SEC Modifies New Attorney Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
2003, at Cl.
79. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. 6324, 6329 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003); Schroeder, supra note 78.
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rectify the consequences of a material violation by
the issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the
issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the
attorney's services were used.8°
Many attorneys will be affected by section 307 of the Act and the
Final Rules, from in-house counsel advising the client to outside
counsel putting client-provided information into proper form for
SEC filing or shareholder distribution.8'
B. "Material Violation of Securities Law or Breach of
Fiduciary Duty or Similar Violation by the Company or
Any Agent Thereof"
An attorney need not report client conduct unless the
violation is "material."8  Section 307 does not define a "material
violation" of securities law, fiduciary duty, or a "similar violation"
that would require an attorney to climb the corporate ladder.83
80. Id. at 6323 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)) (emphasis added). The
proposed version of this rule was much criticized as undermining the attorney-client
relationship and therefore an interference with an attorney's ability to perform his
job effectively. Id. at 6310. Others offering comments on the Proposed Rules "noted
that at least four-fifths of the states now permit or require such disclosures as pertain
to ongoing conduct." Id. at 6311. The SEC saw no reason to delay implementing this
rule. Id. at 6312.
81. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts
Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003-13.htm (Jan. 23, 2003) (stating that the rules "cover attorneys
providing legal services to an issuer who have an attorney-client relationship with the
issuer, and who have notice that documents they are preparing or assisting in
preparing will be filed with or submitted to the Commission"). For a sampling of the
comments sent to the SEC regarding the Proposed Rules, see Comments on
Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
Indicative of the broad reach of the Proposed Rules, the SEC received comments
from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the Council of Bars and Law
Societies of the European Union, and attorneys in Brazil and Venezuela. See id.
82. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,679.
83. Cf Cramton, supra note 56, at 179 (noting that, "[u]ntil the SEC provides
more guidance, securities lawyers will have to make difficult judgment calls: ...
When is a violation 'material'?").
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The Final Rules do not define "material., 84  In the Proposed
Rules, the SEC defined "material" as "conduct or information
about which a reasonable investor would want to be informed
before making an investment decision." 5  This definition of
materiality also has been adopted by the courts in determining
corporate liability for fraudulent or misleading disclosure to
shareholders.8 6
The SEC's Proposed Rules set forth common law
definitions of breach of fiduciary duty with no special definitions
of breach of fiduciary duty.87 The common law definition includes,
but is not limited to, "misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of
duty, abuse of trust, and approval of unlawful transactions." 8 The
Final Rules accept these definitions and incorporate language that
makes clear that violations of federal or state statutes regarding
fiduciary duties are also covered.89
The SEC has not defined what constitutes a "similar
violation," but is clear that it interprets "similar violation" to be a
third category in addition to breach of fiduciary duty and
violations of securities laws (state and federal).9" "[T]o the extent
the Act contemplates sanctions against lawyers who fail to comply,
due process concerns may arise. How can liability flow from an
ambiguous term.., if it is not defined?"'"
84. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6303. The SEC says that "'material'... has a well-established meaning under
the federal securities laws and the Commission intends for that same meaning to
apply here." Id. The SEC looks to Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) and
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) as exemplary of the
definition of "material" in the securities context. See id. at n.59.
85. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71,679.
86. See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
87. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,678.
88. Id.
89. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6301.
90. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,679.
91. Amy J. Longo, SEC to Regulate Corporate Lawyers' Duty of Confidentiality,
LITIG. NEWS (Am. Bar Ass'n/Sec. of Litig., Chicago, Il1.), Jan. 2003, at 1.
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C. Required and Sufficient Evidence
Section 307 of the Act requires that attorneys climb the
corporate ladder when they have "evidence" of a violation.92
Section 307 does not, however, explain what type of "evidence" is
required and sufficient to trigger the attorney's responsibility to
report.93 The SEC has been clear in prior decisions, however, that
"a lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for fraud by
closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand.""
The Proposed Rules were similar to ABA Model Rule 1.13,
but the ABA Model Rule limits reporting to violations relating to
the attorney's representation and section 307 of the Act's internal
reporting requirements contains no such limitation.95 Section 307
appears to require, and the Proposed Rules would have required,
the attorney to report evidence of any material violation, even if
the suspected violation is not directly related to the representation
by the corporate attorney and even if the violation is not actually
known.96
Initially, the SEC felt that ABA Model Rule 1.13 was too
narrow because of the "knowledge" requirement and therefore
would not allow attorney reporting in enough cases to fulfill the
Act's goal of protecting the public interest.97  In short, the
Proposed Rules would have required the corporate attorney to do
more than accept his client's representations at face value and to
92. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2002) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-377).
93. Cramton, supra note 56, at 179 (recognizing the question of "[w]hen does a
lawyer have sufficient 'evidence' of a violation?").
94. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 488-89 (2d. Cir. 1968) (noting further that, at
least in the case of non-technical information, an attorney may not simply rely on
information provided by his client).
95. Cf Implementation of Standards of Profession Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,682. "The ABA's Model Rule 1.13 includes a similar but narrower
reporting requirement for attorneys representing an organization, applicable only
when the attorney knows that a violation is occurring or going to occur that is likely
to result in substantial injury to the organization." Id.
96. See id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
97. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
Fed. Reg. at 71,682. But see id. (stating that the "reporting obligation is not triggered
until the attorney can be sure that the officer or employee will actually pursue an
illegal course of action").
2003]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
be alert to potential violations even if such matters arise outside
the scope of the representation.
In fact, the SEC adopted a very complex standard for
determining when to report up the ladder.98 Under the Final
Rules, an attorney must report up the ladder when he has
"credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable,
under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney
not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."99 The complexity
of this standard's language will make it difficult for the SEC to
discipline an attorney for failure to comply with the rules. 100
Another significant aspect of the evidentiary requirement is
whether the attorney who has suspicions of fraud or other illegal
activity must undertake an investigation before reporting.1"1 The
SEC believes that since section 307 does not require actual
knowledge of the violation, there generally is no duty to
investigate evidence of a material violation before reporting the
potential violation.0 2
If material corporate misconduct does occur and the
attorney has not internally reported violations, the attorney's
decision not to report should be analyzed in light of the evidence
that the attorney actually had or had reason to know at the time of
action or inaction.0 3 But even though attorneys are to be judged
on the facts known or those facts that could reasonably be known
at the time, later disclosed facts "will inevitably color a fact-
98. Glater, supra note 57.
99. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6321 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e)).
100. See Glater, supra note 57. While the "noisy withdrawal" proposal drew
criticism from many lawyers, the changed standard for internal reporting has drawn
harsh criticism from the public. See Norris, supra note 70 (asserting that this and
other changes made in adopting the final rules "make it less likely that the rule will
ever produce a report"). The SEC, however, maintains that the revised language was
adopted to "clarif[y] aspects of the objective standard that the Commission sought to
achieve in the definition originally proposed." Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6301.
101. See Cramton, supra note 56, at 152.
102. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71,682. The SEC goes on to note that there is nothing in the Proposed
Rules that prevent an attorney from undertaking such an investigation. See id.
103. Cramton, supra note 56, at 146 (noting that a "lawyer's conduct should not be
judged on the basis of facts learned at a later time").
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finder's retrospective judgment."'" Attorneys engaged in a public
corporation representation or as in-house counsel should use more
than usual care in looking for potential violations when engaged in
aggressive or creative lawyering.'°5
V. PROTECTION FOR THE WHISTLEBLOWING ATTORNEY?
What happens to the attorney who does climb the
corporate ladder in compliance with section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act? Does the attorney receive any protection from
discharge or retaliation by the company? The answers to these
questions are not uniform.1"6
Under ABA Model Rule 1.13, if the corporation's
management refuses to act to rectify the situation as described by
the attorney, the reporting attorney may resign from the corporate
representation.' ° If the attorney is discharged before he can
resign, he faces the reality that courts show a general reluctance to
recognize claims of retaliatory discharge or wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy in favor of in-house lawyers terminated
for whistleblowing. °8 Some courts have, however, held the door
ajar for attorneys seeking protection if they are discharged after an
attempt to uphold the legal profession's standards.0 9 Section 307
requires a new set of professional standards.
While whistleblower protections are not enunciated in
section 307, section 806 of the Act is a provision to protect persons
who, in furtherance of the Act's overall goals, report corporate
wrongdoing."0 This provision provides protection to employees
104. Id. at 147 (noting further that "the hindsight bias, in the civil fraud context,
makes defendants appear more culpable than they may be").
105. Id. at 147.
106. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 43.
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002).
108. E.g. Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 43. But see, e.g., Crews v. Buckman
Lab. Int'l, 78 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that an in-house attorney has a
claim for retaliatory discharge if his discharge results from his attempt to uphold a
professional duty that amounts to "a clear and definitive statement of public policy").
109. See, e.g., Crews, 78 S.W.3d at 853; Kelly v. Hunton & Williams, 1999 WL
408416, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1999) (refusing summary judgment against plaintiff
attorney who claimed he was "forced out" of the firm for questioning a partner's
billing practices).
110. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (2002) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-377).
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who assist in investigations of violations of federal laws that aim to
prevent fraud against shareholders or violations of SEC rules and
regulations."' The provision's protections are limited, however, to
instances when a federal enforcement agency, a congressional
committee or a congressman, or a person in a supervisory position
conducts the investigation." 2 Section 806 does not explicitly state
that it protects employees (or attorneys) who are conducting the
investigation themselves or who report the information in the
absence of a formal investigation.113
Additionally, section 806 of the Act provides protection for
any employee who initiates or participates in a proceeding against
his employer about an alleged violation of SEC regulations or
federal rules relating to frauds on shareholders."4 Consistently
vague, this section of the Act does not define a protected
"proceeding" and it is not clear that an attorney's reporting up the
corporate ladder is a protected action." 5 The Final Rules do
explicitly allow an attorney to use information regarding his report
"in connection with any investigation, proceeding, or litigation in
which the attorney's compliance" with the rules is at issue.' 
16
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulation of attorney ethics has been the traditional
province of bar organizations and state courts," 7 but the mandate
given to the SEC to regulate attorney conduct under section 307 is
quite broad."' Section 307 leaves the SEC free to craft its own
code of ethics restricted only by the mandate that the rules require






116. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6323 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(1)). This
provision is meant to correspond to "'self-defense' exceptions to client-confidentiality
rules in every state." Id. at 6310.
117. Becker, supra note 1.
118. Cramton, supra note 56, at 179.
[Vol. 7
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
violations of the law." 9 At a minimum, however, attorneys will
have to report evidence of wrongdoing that, if disclosed, would
have an effect on an investor's decision to purchase or sell stock in
the company or would have a detrimental effect on the
company.1
20
Even though there are examples of prior existing
administrative ethics regulations, some believe that the legal
profession's historical regime of self governance is threatened.
21
The ABA submitted a lengthy response to the SEC's call for
comments, including requests for postponements or revision of
certain sections of the Proposed Rules.122 The SEC did revise or
postpone implementing some of the most contentious
provisions. 23 While section 307 creates no private cause of action,
such a proposal was made during the bill's passage through
Congress. 24  Furthermore, the SEC has reserved the right to
supplement or amend the rules in the future.
25
Given the current political and social climate resulting from
multiple corporate scandals and the legal profession's failure to
provide adequate safeguards, guidance, and means of reporting
client wrongdoing, the legal profession could be in danger of losing
its privilege of self-regulation. 26  While the SEC postponed
enactment of the "noisy withdrawal" provisions, the issue is by no
means dead. 27 The legal profession must take a warning from the
119. Id. at 178.
120. See supra notes 82 through 91 and accompanying text.
121. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 39, 43.
122. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association,
to Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm.
123. Schroeder, supra note 78.
124. Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 40. In addition, the authors note that,
twenty years ago, Sen. Arlen Specter proposed criminal liability for lawyers who
failed to disclose evidence of their clients' prospective crimes, as well as some past
crimes. Id.
125. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71,670, 71,670 n.4 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002).
126. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 5, at 39.
127. Bilodeau, supra note 9. SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid continues to
be a vocal proponent of a "noisy withdrawal" requirement. Id. Indicative of the
complete divergence of concerns between the SEC and the legal profession,
Commissioner Goldschmid asserts that
"[T]he absolute emphasis on client confidentiality found among so
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hard-line Proposed Rules and address these perceived problems
from within. The federal government has shown its willingness to
regulate the profession if the profession will not regulate itself.
STEPHANIE R.E. PATrERSON
many" lawyers who opposed noisy withdrawal "is
incomprehensibly out of balance .... It is contrary to duties we
place on accountants and directors .... How can an absolute
emphasis on confidentiality be reconciled with the commission's
traditional mandate to protect investors in the public interest?"
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